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Recently it is proved that all inﬁnite assignment games have a non-empty core. Using
this fact, and a technique suggested by L. S. Shapley for ﬁnite permutation games, we
prove similar results for inﬁnite permutation games. Inﬁnite transportation games can
be interpreted as a generalization of inﬁnite assignment games. We show that inﬁnite
transportation games are balanced via a related assignment game. By using certain core
elements of inﬁnite transportation games it can be shown that inﬁnite pooling games
have a non-empty core.
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1. Introduction
Pooling and permutation situations can be seen as special types of one-sided market
models. They are related to transportation and assignment problems, respectively,
which can be interpreted as two-sided market models.
∗Corresponding author.
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An assignment situation is a problem in which agents of two types have to be
matched to each other. Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduced cooperative assign-
ment games when both sets of agents are ﬁnite and they proved that these games
have a non-empty core. Llorca et al. (2004) consider cooperative games related to
inﬁnite assignment situations, where there are a countably inﬁnite number of agents
of each type, and show that there exist core elements.
In a permutation situation with n agents, each player has a job and owns one
machine. They can process their jobs on their own machines, or they can cooperate
rearranging the jobs and machines to reduce the total costs. The second situation
can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility (TUgame). The
class of ﬁnite permutation games, introduced by Tijs et al. (1984) as cost games,
has been shown in several ways to be balanced. In Tijs et al. (1984) the result
is obtained through a theorem due to Birkhoﬀ (1946) and von Neumann (1953)
on double stochastic matrices. The proof given by Curiel and Tijs (1985) is based
on a result of Gale (1984) about the existence of equilibrium in discrete exchange
economies with money. In Klijn et al. (2000) an alternative proof of balancedness
of ﬁnite permutation games is provided relating the core conditions with the prop-
erties of envy-freeness and Pareto eﬃciency. As Tijs et al. (1984) point out, it is
also possible to show balancedness exploiting a connection, suggested in 1984 by
Shapley in a personal communication, between permutation and assignment games.
Quint (1996) shows that all core allocations of a ﬁnite permutation game can be
obtained in this way.
A transportation problem describes a situation in which demands at several
locations for a certain good have to be covered by supplies from other points. The
transport of one unit of the good from a supply point to a demand point generates
a nonnegative proﬁt. The goal of the suppliers and demanders is to maximize the
total proﬁt from transport. The corresponding transportation games can be seen
as an extension of assignment games. In S´ anchez-Soriano et al. (2001b)i ti ss h o w n
that ﬁnite transportation games are balanced.
A pooling situation appears when a set of agents which own property rights of
several interchangeable commodities decide to cooperate by pooling their property
rights in order to achieve as much proﬁt as possible. Potters and Tijs (1987) intro-
duce two types of pooling games arising from pooling situations and prove that both
games have non-empty core. It can be shown that the second class of pooling games
and transportation games, as deﬁned in S´ anchez-Soriano et al. (2001b), coincide.
In the next section the relations between assignment and permutation situations
are analyzed, and related inﬁnite permutation games are shown to be balanced. In
Sec. 3 we study inﬁnite transportation situations and ﬁnd core elements for the
corresponding cooperative TU games. Section 4 is devoted to pooling situations
when the number of agents is countable inﬁnite, and it is proved that the core is
non-empty. Until this point we have only considered games with a ﬁnite value, in
order to take into account the possibility of inﬁnite value some comments are given
in Sec. 5.2nd Reading
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2. Balancedness of Inﬁnite Permutation Games
We start by shortly recalling the ﬁnite case. Consider a situation where there are
N = {1,...,n} agents, each agent i ∈ N has one job to be processed and one
machine to process a job. The machines cannot process more than one job and all
jobs have to be done. The value of player i to process his job on the machine owned
by agent π(i) is the nonnegative reward aiπ(i),w h e r eπ : N → N is a permutation in
the set of all N−permutations, ΠN. Thus a permutation situation can be described
by the pair (N,A)w h e r eA is the nonnegative reward matrix, A =[ aiπ(i)]i∈N.
From this situation Tijs et al. (1984) introduce a cooperative TU game with player







where ΠS is the class of all N−permutations with π(i)=i for all i outside S.T h e
game (N,vP) is a so-called ﬁnite permutation game.
Now we take into account a situation in which there are two types of agents,
for example, the owners of the machines (the suppliers, since they can provide a
service) and those who have to process jobs on these machines (the demanders, as
they have needs to be covered). Denote by M and W these two ﬁnite and disjoint
sets. When agent i ∈ M is matched to agent j ∈ W this gives a nonnegative
proﬁt of aij. This assignment situation can be represented by (M,W,A). In 1972,
Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduced cooperative assignment games associated to
the matching in which each agent i ∈ M is coupled to at most one agent j ∈ W and
vice versa. The corresponding assignment game (M ∪ W,vA)i saTU game with
player set M ∪ W. The worth, vA(S), for a coalition S ⊂ N is the maximal value
that it can obtain by matching its members if S∩M  = ∅ and S ∩W  = ∅,o t h e r w i s e
vA(S)=0 . The maximal total value of paired agents in S, can be determined by










xij ≤ 1, for all j ∈ W ∩ S
 
j∈W∩S
xij ≤ 1, for all i ∈ M ∩ S
xij ∈{ 0,1}, for all i ∈ M ∩ S, j ∈ W ∩ S.
(1)
with value vA(S).
In cooperative game theory we are interested to know how to share the joint
proﬁt among the cooperating agents. The core of an assignment game, C(vA), is
the set of distributions of vA(N) upon which each coalition S will receive at least
as much it can obtain on its own. In assignment games core elements are easy to2nd Reading
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ﬁnd because C(vA) equals the set of optimal solutions of the dual of problem (1),
relaxing the integer conditions by nonnegativity.
Curiel (1997) explores the relationship between assignment and permutation
games, showing that every assignment game is a permutation game. It is also pos-
sible, as Shapley suggested, to ﬁnd an assignment game related to a given permu-
tation game. The procedure indicated by Shapley goes as follows. Let (N,vP)b ea
permutation game with reward matrix A =[ aij]i∈N,j∈N. Consider the assignment
game (M ∪ W,vAP) obtained by duplicating the agents in two sets: the owners of
the machines, M, and the owners of the jobs, W. For all group of players S,i ti s
easy to check that its worth in the permutation game can be obtained from this
assignment game vP(S)=vAP(MS ∪ WS), where MS = M ∩ S and WS = W ∩ S.
Now we introduce inﬁnite permutation situations (N,A) where there is a count-
able inﬁnite number of agents and, therefore, an inﬁnite number of jobs and
machines. The corresponding inﬁnite permutation game (N,vP) is a cooperative
TU game with a countably inﬁnite set of players. As in the ﬁnite case, given
an inﬁnite permutation situation and its corresponding game we can introduce
a related inﬁnite assignment game (M ∪W,vAP), with M = W = N and vP(S)=
vAP(MS ∪WS).
In assignment situations we are interested in how to match, e.g., a set of supply
points to a set of demand points such that we obtain the maximal total proﬁt
when each supply point is assigned to at most one demand point and vice versa.
Consider a problem with an inﬁnite number of production techniques that can be
programmed to produce a certain product which can be chosen from an inﬁnite
number of possible designs. The marketing policy leads to produce unique pieces.
This is an assignment situation in which there is an inﬁnite number of production
techniques (suppliers) and an inﬁnite number of patterns (demanders). The goal
is to achieve the maximal total reward from matching the techniques with the
patterns. Inﬁnite assignment situations and related games are introduced in Llorca
et al. (2004). They prove that, in case the value for the grand coalition N is ﬁnite
and in case it is inﬁnite, these games are balanced. Using the result for assignment
games, we will show the non-emptiness of the core of inﬁnite permutation games.
We describe the procedure through an example based on Llorca et al. (2004).
Example 1. Let (N,A) be the inﬁnite permutation situation with a countable
inﬁnite number of agents, each of whom can provide a service and at the same time
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contains the proﬁts aij when agent i is served by j.L e t( N,vP) be the corresponding
inﬁnite permutation game. We can consider each agent in N as a supplier and as
well as a demander. Thus we can separate all players in two parts and construct a

























i∈WS wi ≥ vAP(S)




i.e. the core of this inﬁnite assignment game. Since we have split into two parts
each agent in the original permutation situation, if we deﬁne xi = ui + wi, for all
i ∈ N, we obtain x =(2,1, 1
2,...) an element of the core in the inﬁnite permutation
game, as the next theorem states.
Theorem 2. Let (N,A) be an inﬁnite permutation situation, with (N,vP) and
(N ∪ N,vAP) the corresponding inﬁnite permutation game and the related assign-
ment game, respectively. Then C(vP)  = ∅.
Proof. According to Theorem 4.1 in Llorca et al. (2004) there exists (u;w) ∈

























for all S ⊂ N where the inequality holds because (u;w) is in the core of the inﬁnite
assignment game.
3. Owen Vectors for Inﬁnite Transportation Games
A transportation situation describes a problem in which demands at diﬀerent loca-
tions for a certain commodity want to be covered by supplies from other points.
The transport of one item of the indivisible good from a supply location i to a
demand point j generates a nonnegative proﬁt of tij. The goal of the suppliers, P,
and demanders, Q, is to obtain the maximal proﬁt (if it exists), transporting from
origins to destinations as much as possible, with the constraints on supplies and
demands. A transportation situation can be represented by (P,Q,T,s,d)w h e r e
s =( si)i∈P and d =( dj)j∈Q are the supply and demand positive integer vectors,
respectively. Inﬁnite transportation situations arise when the number of the two
types of agents (demanders and suppliers) is countably inﬁnite. Inﬁnite assignment
situations can be seen as a special case of inﬁnite transportation situations when
all supplies and demands are 1.2nd Reading
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Related to such an inﬁnite transportation situation of an indivisible good we
deﬁne an inﬁnite transportation game (N,vT) with player set N = P ∪ Q where
P = Q = N. As in assignment games, the worth of coalition S equals zero if
S ∩P = ∅ or S ∩Q = ∅, and the maximal total value of transport among agents in










xij ≤ si, for all i ∈ P ∩ S
 
i∈P∩S
xij ≤ dj, for all j ∈ Q ∩ S
xij ∈ Z+, for all i ∈ P ∩ S, j ∈ Q ∩ S.
(2)
with value vT(S), otherwise.
Given an inﬁnite transportation situation, (P,Q,T,s,d), we can construct a
related inﬁnite assignment situation splitting each supply agent i ∈ P into si supply
points (with 1 unit of supply), each demand point j ∈ Q is divided into dj diﬀerent
players (with demand 1 item), and the per unit proﬁt for all these agents is tij.
Formally, the related assignment situation (M,W,A) has a countably inﬁnite set of
supply points M = {ir|i ∈ P,r ∈{ 1,...,s i}}, a countably inﬁnite set of demanders
W = {jc|j ∈ Q,c ∈{ 1,...,d j}}, and air, jc = tij for all ir ∈ M, jc ∈ W.
The following result states that each solution for the transportation situation
determines a solution for the assignment one (and vice versa) by splitting (merging)
the corresponding agents and both solutions have the same value. This lemma is
given without proof because it resembles that in S´ anchez-Soriano et al. (2001a),
Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 3. Let (P,Q,T,s,d) be an inﬁnite transportation situation, with
(N ∪ N,vT) and (N ∪ N,vAT) the corresponding inﬁnite transportation game and
the related assignment game, respectively. Then, for all S,
vT(S)=vAT(SAT)
where SAT = {ir|i ∈ P ∩ S,r ∈{ 1,...,s i}} ∪ {jc|j ∈ Q ∩ S,c ∈{ 1,...,d j}}.
This result also allows us to replace the integer condition by the nonnegativity








s.t.u i + wj ≥ tij
ui,w j ≥ 0, for all i ∈ P, j ∈ Q
(3)
with value vT
d (N), is the corresponding dual problem for the grand coalition N =
N ∪ N,a n dOT
d (N) denotes the set of its optimal solutions. An inﬁnite number2nd Reading
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of variables and constrains are present in programs (2) and (3) so a duality gap
between their values may arise. The next proposition establishes that in inﬁnite
transportation games there is no duality gap and there exist optimal dual solutions.
Although it is only shown for the grand coalition this holds for all S ⊂ N.
Proposition 4. Let (P,Q,T,s,d) be an inﬁnite transportation situation, and
(N ∪ N,vT) the corresponding inﬁnite transportation game. Then
vT(N)=vT
d (N) and Od(N)  = ∅.
Proof. Theorem 4.1 in Llorca et al. (2004) states that the core of inﬁnite assign-
ment games is always non-empty. So, let (u;w) ∈ C(vAT). Then, uir + wjc ≥ tij
























Deﬁne ¯ ui :=
 si
r=1 uir/si and wj :=
 dj
c=1 wjc/dj, which can be interpreted as










where the ﬁrst equality follows from Lemma 3, the second one from the absence
of duality gap in inﬁnite assignment problems, the third one because (u;w)i sa n
optimal solution of the dual assignment problem for the grand coalition, and the
inequality follows because (u;w) is a feasible dual solution in the transportation
situation. According to Theorem 3.1 in Anderson and Nash (1987) we know that









So we can conclude that there is no duality gap and (¯ u,w) is a dual optimal solution
in the transportation situation for the grand coalition.








d (N) such that zk = skuk if k ∈ P
and zk = dkwk if k ∈ Q
 
,
turns out to be an element of the core of the inﬁnite transportation game, as the
next theorem states.2nd Reading
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Theorem 5. Let (P,Q,T,s,d) be an inﬁnite transportation situation and
(N ∪ N,vT) be the corresponding inﬁnite transportation game. Then
C(v
T) ⊃ Owen(P,Q,T,s,d)  = ∅.
Proof. Let z ∈ Owen(P,Q,T,s,d), which is alwaysnon-empty because OT
d (N) =∅,
and let (u;w) ∈ OT












where the last equality follows from the no gap result in Proposition 4.
Take a coalition S ⊂ N, S  = ∅.I fS ⊂ P or S ⊂ Q then
 
k∈S zk ≥ 0=vT(S)
because zk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ N.W h e nS ∩ P  = ∅ and S ∩ Q  = ∅,w eh a v et h a t
ui + wj ≥ tij for all i ∈ P, j ∈ Q, and this is in particular true for all i ∈ S ∩ P,










holds, for all S ⊂ N. Thus we obtain that z belongs to C(vT).
4. Core Elements of Inﬁnite Pooling Games
Again we start with the ﬁnite case. A pooling situation arises when a set of agents,
who own property rights of several interchangeable commodities, decide to coop-
erate sharing these property rights. Their goal is to maximize the total proﬁt.
Thus, a ﬁnite pooling situation can be described by a 6−tuple (P,M,d,s,O,E),
where P is the ﬁnite set of agents, M the ﬁnite set of commodities, s ∈ ZM
++ and
d ∈ ZP
++, E ∈ R
P×M




i∈P Oij = sj. A feasible distribution
for a pooling situation is a matrix X ∈ Z
P×M
+ with integer entries and such that  
i∈P xij ≤ sj,∀j ∈ M, and
 
j∈M xij ≤ di,∀i ∈ P. To ﬁnd an optimal allocation




Associated with a pooling situation, Potters and Tijs (1987) introduced a ﬁnite
cooperative TU game (N,vO) with player set N = P and the value for a coalition
















Oij, for all j ∈ M ∩ S
xij ∈ Z+, for all i ∈ P ∩ S, j ∈ M ∩ S
(4)
what the members in S can gain by pooling their rights.2nd Reading
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Going to inﬁnite pooling situations and their corresponding games, they occur
when the number of players and the set of commodities are considered countably
inﬁnite. Just as in the ﬁnite case, the value vO(S) of coalition S can be determined
by the linear program (4), replacing the maximum by the supremum since the sets
P and M are countable inﬁnite.
We can consider each player formed by two parts: As a demander of a service
and as the owner of property rights of several commodities. Therefore, if we take
into account the total property rights
 
i∈P Oij for each commodity j ∈ M and
split the player set into P ∪ M, we will deal with an inﬁnite transportation situa-
tion (P,M,T,d,s) related to the inﬁnite pooling situation (P,M,d,s,O,E)w h e r e
T = E and sj =
 
i∈P Oij, for all j ∈ M. The corresponding inﬁnite transportation
game (N ∪ N,vTO)s a t i s ﬁ e s
vO(S)=vTO({S ∩ P}∪{ S ∩ M}), (5)
where S ∩ P = S and S ∩ M := {j ∈ M|
 
i∈P∩S Oij = sj > 0}.
Theorem 6. Let (N,N,d,s,O,E) be an inﬁnite pooling situation, with (N,vO) and
(N ∪ N,vTO) the corresponding inﬁnite pooling game and the related transportation
game, respectively. Then C(vO)  = ∅.
Proof. According to Proposition 4, there exists (u;w) ∈ RP × RM as o l u t i o no f
the dual program for the grand coalition. This element can be seen as a shadow
price vector for the resources, di for agents in P and sj =
 
i∈P Oij for all j ∈ M,















d ({S ∩ P}∪{ S ∩ M})
= vTO({S ∩ P}∪{ S ∩ M}), (7)
for all S ⊂ N. Since each player i ∈ P is a demander of a service and, at the same
time, he has rights over j ∈ M, let us consider zi = diui+
 
j∈M Oijwj for all i ∈ P.
We will show that the vector z ∈ RP, where each coordinate can be interpreted as





























sjwj = vTO(N ∪ N)=vO(N),2nd Reading
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sjwj ≥ vTO({S ∩ P}∪{ S ∩ M})=vO(S),
where the inequality holds from (7) and the last equality from (5).
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have considered inﬁnite assignment games with ﬁnite value. When
vA(N ∪ N)=+ ∞, there is no duality gap and the utopia payoﬀ can be used
to assure balancedness of inﬁnite assignment games. This allocation (u∗,w∗) ∈
RN ×RN is obtained giving to each agent what he can expect at most, i.e.
u
∗
i =s u p
j∈W
aij∀i ∈ N and w
∗
j =s u p
i∈M
aij∀j ∈ N,
and it would play the same role as the optimal dual solutions to prove the non-
emptiness of the core in inﬁnite permutation and transportation games with
unbounded value.
We have shown the non-emptiness of the core in inﬁnite permutation games
using the idea suggested by L. S. Shapley for the ﬁnite case. As it was pointed
out in the introduction there are other techniques to prove balancedness in ﬁnite
permutation games. So it remains an open question how they could be adjusted to
this inﬁnite context, especially what is related to the Birkhoﬀ-von Neumann result
on doubly stochastic matrices.
In Sec. 3 we have analyzed the problem of ﬁnding core elements when we have
to transport indivisible goods. These results can be applied with inﬁnitely divisible
goods when the total supply and demand are inﬁnite, assuming that all suppliers
and demanders want to provide or to receive a positive amount. This is due to the
fact that this kind of transportation situations can be read as inﬁnite transportation
situations with indivisible goods.
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